We model two experts who must make "bottom line" (yes/no) predictions about whether an event will occur or not. The experts receive private signals about the possibility of the bad event occurring-private signals that are much more informative than the coarse recommendations they can ultimately communicate. The experts like to make correct predictions, and otherwise we restrict their payoffs only to ensure they play cutoff strategies-strategies such that an expert predicts the bad event will occur when he thinks the bad event is more likely to occur. The experts may care about both absolute and relative performance. We show that when either or both experts receive uniformly more informative signals, their collective unanimous predictions can become less informative, so that the event is more likely to occur when they both predict it will not and the event is less likely to occur when they predict it will occur. There are information improvements that result in this perverse outcome for any payoffs the experts might have, including when the experts' interests are exactly aligned with those of society. The ubiquity of the unintuitive phenomenon of perversity raises the question of how the principal should optimally incentivize the experts subject to the constraint of coarse (yes/no) advice, especially when their interests are not aligned with those of society. We find that, without the possibility of huge transfers, the principal's ability to extract good advice or even to interpret imperfect advice correctly is severely limited.
1 Introduction "In recent, rueful economics discussions, an all-purpose punch line has become 'nobody could have predicted. . . ' It's what you say with regard to disasters that could have been predicted, should have been predicted and actually were predicted by a few economists who were scoffed at for their pains." (Paul Krugman, "How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?", New York Times Magazine, September 2, 2009.) In an influential article, Paul Krugman laments the fact that all but a few economists failed to predict the recent global financial crisis. In fact, it can be argued that in the last twenty years, the majority of economists were taken by surprise by most economic calamities, including the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial crises in Asia and South America.
The economics profession seems to use ever better data and ever more sophisticated analytical tools. Why do economists continue to be so bad at predicting economic and financial crises?
Our answer is that the optimizing behavior of experts can react in counterintuitive ways to strict improvements in the quality of information. In a large set of circumstances, there exist information improvements that can hurt the credibility of the experts' unanimous predictions. When the experts are strategic and are judged not only on absolute performance but also on performance relative to other experts, then the effects of better information can be strictly bad for society in equilibrium.
We now sketch the framework in which we derive these conclusions. Consider two experts, say Alice and Bob. They are called experts because they are in the business of analyzing large amounts of data using sophisticated models. Each must figure out if the results of the analysis become worrisome enough to sound the alarm about the possibility of a rare event. Sounding the alarm or not are the only actions available to Alice and Bob. In other words, as experts, they must make "bottom line" predictions.
Both Alice and Bob know that a rare event happens with some probability, but whether it is about to occur is not known to anyone. The complicated information of each expert is modeled as a signal, which is drawn from one distribution if the event is about to occur and from another distribution if it is not. Some signals are more worrisome than others, and the signals of the two experts are independent conditional on the realization of the event.
After observing their signals, both Alice and Bob must choose whether to predict the event or not. Alice's payoff depends on her prediction, the prediction of Bob, and whether the bad event ends up occurring. The same holds for Bob. Alice faces the usual statistical tradeoff between sounding the alarm when she should not have (making a Type I Error) and failing to sound it when she should have (making a Type II error). So does Bob. Moreover, Alice knows that her prediction will be compared to Bob's, and that drives her to take Bob's expected prediction into account when making hers. The same is true for Bob.
Suppose that either Alice, or Bob alone, or both Alice and Bob, start to get systematically more informative signals. That is, they gain the ability to make predictions that have both a lower chance of Type I error and a lower chance of a Type II error. This may happen because they got access to new data or because they figured out a way to process existing data better than before. Society now has the potential to be better informed than before. But, an improvement in the quality of Alice's and Bob's information may result in a perverse effect. In particular, the experts as a group may become less credible whenever they make the same prediction together. We call an information improvement perverse (at a certain equilibrium) if it has this consequence.
We identify both necessary and sufficient conditions for a perverse information improvement to be possible. An intuition for how such a thing can occur is as follows. Following an improvement in their information, each of Alice and Bob will always make either fewer Type I errors, or fewer Type II errors. However, it may be the case that Bob makes more Type I errors while Alice makes more Type II errors. If the reduction in Bob's Type II errors is dominated by Alice's increase in Type II errors, while Alice's reduction in Type I errors is dominated by Bob's increase in Type I errors, then Bob and Alice's collective predictions can become less informative. We note that perversity of information improvement is a group phenomenon. If Alice is the only expert and she gets a more informative signal, then she must do better with respect to at least one type of error.
Suppose the rare event being predicted by the experts is bad, but that society can take costly preemptive action. How can society best use the predictions of the experts to decide whether to take the preemptive action or not? Can society make a clever choice of a decision rule that mitigates the effect of a perverse information improvement? Whenever the experts play cutoff strategies, the event will be most likely to occur when both experts predict it will occur and least likely to occur when both experts predict it will not occur. An optimal decision rule that makes any use of the experts' predictions will therefore have to take preemptive action when both experts predict the event and not take preemptive action when the experts do not predict the event. For any such decision rule, a perverse information improvement makes the decision rule perform less well in the cases when these unanimous predictions are made.
Perverse information improvements do not pin down how the discordant predictions of the experts change. Suppose society takes preemptive action under a discordant prediction. Society then does better, at the margin, when the posterior probability of the bad event conditional on such a prediction increases, and does worse, at the margin, when the posterior probability of the bad event conditional on such predictions decreases. (The opposite is true when society does not take preemptive action given the discordant prediction.) Of course, society can also adjust the decision rule to take advantage of changes in the discordant predictions. Nevertheless, even under the optimal decision rule, changes in the discordant predictions after an information improvement may make society better off or worse off. Whether a change in the discordant predictions of the experts benefits society or not will depend on society's payoffs and experts' incentives. We identify situations in which, supposing that society optimally chooses a decision rule, perverse information improvements make society worse off for any preferences it might have. However, it is also possible for the gains obtained by the correct handling of discordant information to outweigh the losses caused by the reduced quality of unanimous predictions. Can a society get around the problems associated with extracting information from strategic experts? Perhaps if a principal (representing the society at large) knows how the experts' predictions are distorted due to their strategic interaction, she might be able to provide incentives to undo these distortions. Specifically, the principal might be able to write contracts that resolve strategic incentive problems that give rise to perverse information improvements. We show that under reasonable conditions, there is no contract that induces experts to truthfully reveal their types. These conditions are that: (i) the experts' types are privately known; (ii) the principal must use all the information available to her when deciding whether to take the preemptive action; (iii) experts care (an arbitrarily small amount) about whether their advice is followed or not; and (iv) the principal has some finite upper bound on the size of transfers that she can make.
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The basic problem driving this non-contractability result is as follows. Since experts' types affect the meaning of their advice, experts may distort their reports about their types depending on what they want the outcome to be. An expert of one type might want to misrepresent himself as another type, whereas the expert of this other type want to misrepresent himself as the first type. Information rents that incentivize one type to truthfully report only serve to further incentivize the other type to misreport his type.
Section 2 lays out the basic model, assumptions, and definitions, and discusses the existence of equilibrium. Section 3 states the conditions under which improvements in informa-tion reduce the credibility of unanimous predictions and explores the implications of this. Section 4 discusses potential contracting solutions and their limitations. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
Our paper is most closely related to the literature on committees.
2 The committees literature focuses on how committees can make informed decisions when individual committee members have private information and only partially aligned incentives. The problem of committee members collating their information to make a decision is therefore similar to the problem of a principal collating the predictions of multiple experts to make a decision. The typical setup in the committees literature is as follows: (i) committees must make binary decisions; (ii) committee members have private information; (iii) all members have the aligned objective of wanting the committee to avoid Type I and Type II errors; and (iv) although all committee members dislike both Type I and Type II errors, their relative preferences over avoiding Type I versus Type II errors can differ. Committee members, knowing each others' preferences, may then strategically adjust their reports so that the committee's decision trades of the possibility of making Type I and Type II errors in a way that aligns with their preferences. These strategic manipulations result in private information becoming garbled and the committee making less well informed decisions than it could if it shared information completely (Li, Rosen, and Suen, 2001) .
Our model differs from the committees literature in a number of ways. First, we assume that the principal is a non-expert in the matter being considered, and that the experts have more fine-grained information that they are unable to fully communicate to the principal. We model this by assuming that experts must make "bottom line" (yes/no) predictions. Second, we allow each expert to have preferences over managing his reputation-in particular, whether he would prefer to herd with the other expert, or stand out from the other expert.
3 To do this we generalize the payoff space of the experts considered in the committees 2 Our paper is also somewhat related to literature on testing experts. In this paper we assume that experts truly have expertise in their field and restrict them to make a coarse and easily falsifiable prediction about a single event. However, when experts' can make more nuanced predictions about many events, the issue of separating true experts from false experts is raised. There are then important philosophical questions about what constitutes a "scientific" prediction, and whether true experts can be distinguished from false but strategic experts. See Sandroni (2003) , Dekel and Feinberg (2006) , Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2008) , Feinberg and Stewart (2008) , Olszewski and Sandroni (2008, 2010) , and Fortnow and Vohra (2009) .
3 Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) first consider a single expert's incentives to distort his predictions to improve his reputation. They then show that when multiple experts make sequential observable predictions, herding can occur and that this stops the efficient accumulation of information. In contrast, we focus on the strategic interactions of experts making simultaneous predictions and assume that experts must make "bottom line" predictions.
literature. We show that when experts have similar preferences over relative performance, the strategic effects on predictions are relatively large, whereas when experts differ in this dimension the strategic distortions to their predictions are relatively small. This qualifies results from the committees literature which show that when committee members have similar preferences over Type I versus Type II errors, less information is garbled in equilibrium (Li, Rosen and Suen, 2001) .
4 Finally, we extend our model by assuming that experts have private information about their preferences and consider the principal's contracting problem. We also ask different questions from the committees literature. In the committees literature a primary concern is how information should be transmitted to trade off strategic distortions and how fine-grained the information communicated is. This trade-off results in endogenously coarse information being transmitted in equilibrium, in a way that is reminiscent of cheap talk models (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) . We instead directly assume that only coarse information can be transmitted by the experts and then consider the informativeness of their joint predictions.
5 In particular we focus on the joint informativeness of the experts' advice before and after their information has improved. Whilst in the committees literature more informed experts are always beneficial (Li, Rosen and Suen, 2001; Li and Suen, 2004; Suen 2004; Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2006) , we show that experts can be collectively less informative following an information improvement. An important force in the committees literature is that the principal will want to listen more carefully to an expert when that expert's prediction goes against his natural bias. If a principal has a prior leaning towards a given decision, only an expert with weakly more extreme biases in the same direction, who makes a predictions against his (and the principal's) bias, will be able to change the principal's decision. This force is explored in Li and Suen (2004) to analyze the optimal composition of committees and in Suen (2004) to show why agents may endogenously collect information that reenforces their initial beliefs, thereby preventing beliefs from converging. For the same reason, a principal will want to use information about experts' preferences when interpreting their information. However, a principal cannot do this if she does not know experts' preferences. This motivates our inquiry into the question of when a principal can write contracts with the experts that incentivize them to reveal their types truthfully, allowing the principal to optimally interpret the experts' advice.
Predictions Game

The Environment
Players There are two experts indexed indexed i = 1, 2.
Actions Each expert chooses whether to predict an event or not: x i ∈ {1, 0}. We define the event E to be {X = 1}; its complement {X = 0} is denoted by E.
2.
For each expert i, nature draws a private signal S i ∈ S = [0, 1] whose cumulative distribution function is: G i if E = 1 and F i otherwise. These signals are conditionally independent, where the conditioning is on E.
3. Simultaneously, each expert predicts x i ∈ {1, 0}.
Strategies The strategy of each expert is a Borel measurable function
with σ i (s) describing the probability with which i plays x i = 1 upon observing the signal S i = s.
Payoffs Payoffs are as follows. Expert 1 chooses the row and 2 chooses the column, and payoffs are listed with that of 1 coming first. All the constants are positive numbers-experts like to make correct predictions and dislike making incorrect predictions.
The experts simultaneously attempt to correctly predict the occurrence of the event E. They predict the event E by choosing the action 1 (and conversely predict the event E by choosing the action 0). An expert who knew the event E had occurred would have a dominant strategy to play 1, and similarly, one who knew that E had occurred would have a dominant strategy to play 0. However, the experts receive only a noisy signal of E. Given the signal they receive they update their beliefs 6 before choosing their action x i ∈ {1, 0}.
The choice of the other experts will affect an expert's payoff.
Discussion of the Environment
We restrict the experts to make yes/no predictions to capture the idea that the "bottom-line" recommendations experts make are much coarser than their information. We also restrict the agents to receive conditionally independent signals. Including an additional signal observed by both experts, but not the observers of their predictions, would not change results. The commonly observed signal would adjust the common prior of the experts but subsequent analysis would go through with this new common prior. A fully general model would permit for any arbitrary correlations of agents' signals and model their joint distribution. However, this generality would come at the cost of substantial additional complexity so we focus on the case of conditionally independent signals.
Key Quantities
It will be important how sensitive experts' payoffs are to: (i) keeping up with the other expert when the other expert is correct; (ii) outperforming the other expert when the other expert is wrong. The sensitivity of an expert i's payoffs to keeping up with the other expert when the event E occurs is K i ≡ a i + c i . This is the change in i's payoff from correctly predicting the event E as opposed to incorrectly failing to predict E when the other expert correctly predicts E. Similarly, the sensitivity of an expert i's payoffs from keeping up with the other expert when E occurs is K i ≡ a i + c i . The sensitivity of an expert i's payoffs to outperforming the other expert when E occurs is O i ≡ b i + d i and their payoff from outperforming the other expert when E occurs is
Assumptions 2.4.1 Maintained Assumptions on Signal Distributions
We assume that no signal is fully informative-both signals have full support under both event E and E. Indeed, we assume that F i has a differentiable density f i and G i has a differentiable density g i , each defined 7 on [0, 1), such that f i (s) > 0 and g i (s) > 0 for all s ∈ [0, 1) and for i ∈ {1, 2}. Under these assumptions, the quantity g i (s)/f i (s) is well defined and corresponds to expert i's odds ratio on the event E to E after observing a signal
.
We assume that the signals in the domain [0, 1] are ordered such that this odds ratio is strictly increasing as a function of s for each expert i and that the odds ratio is lowest when s = 0. Higher signals indicate the event E is more likely to occur. This is the monotone likelihood ratio assumption. Via a change of variables, we may assume without loss of generality that F i (s) = s for all s ∈ [0, 1]: that is, we may assume that S i is uniformly distributed when the event E does not occur. This makes f i (s) the uniform density. It also makes g i (s) equal to the odds ratio. One immediate implication of the monotone likelihood ratio assumption is that g i (s) is weakly increasing in s.
Definition 1. We call the pair (G 1 , G 2 ) the signal structure of the game.
Payoffs
No Strategic Sensitivity under the Null We assume in some results that there is no strategic sensitivity under the null. This requires that when the event does not occur (E), an expert's incentives do not depend on the prediction of the other expert. Regardless of whether the other expert made the correct or incorrect prediction, an expert i receives the same change in payoff when he changes his prediction from being wrong to being right:
While this is not without loss of generality, it allows us focus on strategic behavior relating to the predictions under the alternative hypothesis, the unusual and "high-profile" event E.
Limited Strategic Sensitivity A final assumption that we will sometimes need is that experts' payoffs have limited strategic sensitivity to each other. This requires that for each
This condition requires that experts gain from a correct prediction are not too sensitive to the choice of the other expert. For example, a sufficient condition for limited strategic sensitivity is that
]. We assume there is limited strategic sensitivity to ensure that experts will play cutoff strategies. When an expert receives a high signal indicating that the event E is more likely, they will then be more likely to predict the event E. Without this assumption strategic considerations can overwhelm an expert's decision on when to predict the event E and his prediction need not be monotonic in his signal.
Equilibrium and Errors
In Appendix A we show that, under the assumptions in Section 2.4, cutoff strategies are always played in equilibrium, and that a Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists. Expert i predicts the event E whenever S i ≥ γ i and we refer to γ i ∈ [0, 1] as i's cutoff. From now on, we will consider only equilibria in which both experts play cutoff strategies, whether this is obtained under the above conditions or some other conditions. Given that cutoff strategies are being played, we can then simply define some standard statistical quantities for each expert. In the event that E has not occurred, the distribution of the signal S i is uniform, so α i ≡ 1 − γ i is the probability of expert i choosing x i = 1 when E has not occurred. This is the probability of expert i making a type I error. Similarly, β i ≡ G i (γ i ) is the probability of expert i making a type II error-that is, choosing x i = 0 when E has occurred. To summarize:
When Better Informed Experts Give Less Informative Advice
We now identify conditions under which "better" information becoming available to the experts can make their unanimous predictions less informative. These results will be derived for interior, locally unique equilibria. By standard (Sard's theorem) arguments, local uniqueness is satisfied generically and conditions for there to exist an interior equilibrium are identified Appendix A. Appendix A also identifies conditions under which there is a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Before stating our main results formally we introduce some new terms.
The Perturbation: Better Information
In Section 2.5 it was shown that the experts' cutoff strategies mapped directly into their probabilities of making the two kinds of errors (type I and II). When choosing their cutoff strategies, experts are trading off a lower cutoff and a lower probability of a type I error (a false positive) versus a higher cutoff and a lower probability of a type II error (failing to predict the event). This trade off can be represented as a error avoidance possibility frontier where their signal technology constrains their choice of type I and type II errors. This is shown in Figure 1 . An expert i receives better information when their error avoidance possibility frontier shifts out. It is straightforward to show that this corresponds exactly to a first order stochastic dominance shift outwards in the CDF (G i ) of the signal under the event E, such that when the event E occurs, higher signals are received with higher probability. Indeed, the error avoidance possibility frontier is s i → 1 − G i (s i ).
9 An expert with improved information can then always reduce both their type I and type II error.
To make precise the notion of shifts in information quality we introduce a parameter θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1] as a second argument in G i and g i . Thus, we now view G i as a function depending on both a signal in the signal space and a parameter in the parameter space, and we introduce a tilde to remind us of the variability:
is the probability of expert i getting a signal s or lower under the alternative, when the error avoidance frontier is at the location decreed by θ. We will call a pair of functions ( G 1 , G 2 ) the variable signal structure of the game. A variable signal structure ( G 1 , G 2 ) is said to extend a signal structure (G 1 , G 2 ) if G i (s; 0) = G i (s) for each s and i. We will always assume that G i (·; θ) has a differentiable density for each i and θ.
Of course, since the information depends on θ, so does equilibrium. Moving this parameter will correspond to shifting the distribution of information. Since the signal distributions, as well as everything that is computed from them, now depends on two arguments, we will have to indicate what variable derivatives are taken with respect to. The prime notation will always refer to derivatives taken in the first variable of any function, and ∂ θ will refer to derivatives taken in the shift parameter θ. A new equivalent definition of better information can now be stated.
Definition 2. Fix a function G i : S × Θ → [0, 1]. We say that an agent i receives better information as θ increases if ∂ θ G(γ, θ) ≤ 0 at every γ ∈ (0, 1) and ∂ θ G(γ, θ) < 0 for γ in some open interval.
An Illustration of What Can Go Wrong
Improvements in experts' information do not necessarily have the intuitive effect of improving the quality of information available to an outside observer. Indeed, it is possible that experts' information strictly improves but the information available to be extracted becomes strictly worse in a sense that we now make precise. The following example illustrates how better informed experts can make less informative predictions.
Suppose expert 1 receives an information improvement as shown in Figure 2a . Without any strategic interaction expert 1 would then make fewer type I errors and fewer type II errors. The experts' prediction would then be more informative. However, each experts' optimal choice of cutoff depends on what they expect the other expert's cut off to be. 2b shows that Expert 1, absent any strategic interaction would choose a higher cut off. However, anticipating this Expert 2 will want to choose a lower cut off. This leads Expert 1 to choose a higher cutoff and so on-in this example, both experts' cut off choices are strategic substitutes.
The strategic interaction resulting in expert 1 choosing a higher cutoff results in their relative cost of making a type I and type II error changing. This is shown in Figure 2a . After the strategic interaction expert 1, despite their information improvement, make type II errors with higher probability. The strategic interaction results in expert 2 choosing a lower cut off so they make fewer type II errors, but more type I errors. This is shown in Figure 2c . Overall, the experts collective predictions then become strictly less informative to the principal: Expert 1 makes more type I and type II errors after the information improvement than expert 2 made before the information improvement. Expert 2 makes more type I and type II errors after the information improvement than expert 1 made before the information improvement. This perverse outcome is shown in Figure 2d .
We now formalize what we mean by perverse outcomes and identify necessary and sufficient conditions for perversity.
The Outcome Variable: Information Extracted
The benefits experts' predictions provide can be measured by considering a hypothetical observer's posteriors. This hypothetical observer is assumed to know the experts' types (payoffs). How worried should the observer be when both experts forecast the rare event? How calm should she be when both don't? To study these questions we note that the observer who sees the experts' actions (x i , which can be equal to 1 or 0) but not their information (the signals S i ) can form a posterior belief about the rare event, which we write Q(x 1 , x 2 ; θ), where the arguments are the experts' predictions. It will be convenient to look at the odds ratio
and at its logarithm, (x 1 , x 2 ; θ) = log R(x 1 , x 2 ; θ).
In Theorem 1 we characterize the comparative statics of in θ.
We may think of r as being captured by a 2 × 2 matrix of the posterior odds ratios on the event E induced by various reports. We can be more explicit about what these posterior odds ratios are.
Information Extracted
Define the matrix L to be the one containing the values of evaluated at the various possible reports. This is just the entrywise logarithm of the above table viewed as a 2 × 2 matrix.
Note that L depends on the cutoffs the agents are selecting, and so in equilibrium it depends on θ.
Definition 3. Fix payoffs of the game. The variable signal structure ( G 1 , G 2 ) is perverse at an equilibrium (γ * 1 , γ * 2 ) if: (i) both experts receive weakly better information, and at least one receives strictly better information, as θ increases; and (ii) (1, 1; 0) < 0 while (0, 0; 0) > 0.
That is, a signal structure is perverse if it is a "Pareto improvement" in the quality of the experts information but induces:
• the posterior on E when both experts warn (x i = 1, i = 1, 2) gets lower; and
• the posterior on E when neither expert warns (x i = 0, i = 1, 2) gets higher.
When Better Informed Experts Give Less Informative Advice
When Perversity is Possible
We now identify necessary and sufficient condition for perversity to be possible. To do this, we define two types of error elasticities for the experts (which depend on the equilibrium being played and on θ) as follows.
This expression has a simple intuition. Consider the likelihood ratio on the event E induced by agent i issuing a warning. Then i is the elasticity of this likelihood ratio with respect to the cutoff chosen by agent i. In other words, it measures the sensitivity of the principal's beliefs to the strategic decision of agent i in the state of the world where i issues a warning. The elasticity i is the analogous quantity in the state of the world where i does not issue a warning.
We consider the effect of improved information at the margin-all quantities are evaluated at the unperturbed equilibrium, i.e. when θ = 0.
Theorem 1. Fix payoffs of the game. Consider a signal structure (G 1 , G 2 ) and a stable equilibrium (γ * 1 , γ * 2 ) of the game. There is a variable signal structure ( G 1 , G 2 ) that 
What Perversity Means for the Use of Expert Advice
Consider a binary decision that must be made by a principal based on the experts' advice, where action y = 1 is optimal for the principal under E and action y = 0 is optimal otherwise. Consider any equilibrium in which the experts play cutoff strategies such that they predict x i = 1 when their signals are high and x i = 0 when their signals are low.
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Any rational deterministic decision rule that uses the experts' information must take action y = 1 when the experts both recommend taking the action and action y = 0 when the experts unanimously recommend not taking it. Theorem 1 then shows that there are almost always perturbations that cause the principal to suffer (i.e. make poorer decisions than before) when predictions are unanimous. When predictions are discordant, the principal may be better off or worse off depending on her decision rule and whether the event E is more of less likely, conditional on each of the discordant predictions. Theorem 1 does not in general identify information improvements under which any principal is always worse off. To show that there are perverse information improvements which make a principal worse off, regardless of her relative preferences over Type I and Type II errors, consider again the example in Section 3.2.
We have already argued that in any rational deterministic decision in which the principal uses the experts' advice: (i) principal takes the action y = 1 after both experts make positive predictions (x 1 = x 2 = 1); and (ii) the principal takes the action y = 0 after both experts make the negative predictions (x 1 = x 2 = 0). There are then only four choices left for the principal. She can take or not take the action when: (i) x 1 = 1 and x 2 = 0; and (ii) x 1 = 0 and x 2 = 1. Denote by q any deterministic decision rule, so that q(x 1 , x 2 ) is the probability (1 or 0) of taking action y = 1 after receiving recommendations x 1 and x 2 .
In light of this, let us return to the example of Section 3.2. Define by q(x 1 , x 2 ) the principal's optimal deterministic decision rule after the perturbation. Now suppose that this deterministic decision rule were used for the experts' predictions before the information improvement, but with the roles of expert 1's and expert 2's predictions swapped. Define this new decision rule by q(x 1 , x 2 ) = q(x 2 , x 1 ). Figure 2(d) shows that q applied under the old information must do strictly better than q with the new information (since, in equilibrium, Expert 1's pre-perturbation performance strictly dominates Expert 2's post-perturbation performance; similarly, Expert 2's pre-perturbation performance strictly dominates Expert 1's post-perturbation performance). The optimal decision rule under the old information must do at least as well as q for the principal. Thus, the optimal rule under the new information is dominated by the optimal rule under the old information. For any relative preferences the principal might have over Type I and Type II errors, she is strictly worse off after the information improvement identified in the example of Section 3.2.
An Example with Common Interests
The problem of perversity is not traceable solely to the fact that experts' interests are potentially misaligned with those of society. To illustrate this, consider the following example, which also illustrates some of the ideas at the heart of the proof of Theorem 1.
Example 1. Let the ex-ante probability of the event be p = 1/2, and assume
It is readily verified that these are two cumulative distribution functions with well-defined differentiable densities on [0, 1). Let us posit that there is a social cost c I = 1 of a type I error (wrongly taking the preemptive action) and a social cost c II = 1.5 of a type II error (not taking the preemptive action when it should have been taken). If the society takes the correct action, there is no cost and the payoff is 0. Let us assume that the experts' payoffs are exactly those of society. This is a special case of the general form of expert payoffs given in the model. First let us consider a world in which society can dictate to each expert the signals under which he is to sound the alarm. That is, the social planner solves the problem of choosing the sets Γ 1 , Γ 2 so that expert i chooses action x i = 1 if and only if S i ∈ Γ 1 . It is easy to verify that, whichever decision rule (positive or negative status quo) is being used, the planner will choose each Γ i to be a cutoff set: an interval that ranges from some point to the signal 1. This is true no matter what the other Γ j is.
12 Thus, each expert, when he has the same payoffs as society, will do the same. Given this, we can compute the optimal cutoffs under the positive status quo rule and under the negative status quo rule by computing the optimal cutoffs and the expected social loss in each case. In this case, it turns out that the unanimous rule is better. The optimal cutoffs are γ * 1 = 0.535 and γ * 2 = 0.339, with an expected social loss of 0.532.
13
Now we will specify an improvement in experts' information. To do this, define
This function is depicted in Figure 3 . With this in hand, we define, for some constants λ i > 0, µ > 0, and ν i that we will specify shortly, the p.d.f.
and then define G i as the corresponding c.d.f. 14 It is easy to see that, because of the shape of h, this results in an information improvement in the sense of Definition 2. For θ sufficiently small (and, in particular, the θ we will use), we can ensure that g(·; θ) is strictly increasing in the first argument. Let the constants be defined as follows λ 1 = 22.9 λ 2 = 14.5 µ = 100 ν 1 = 0.529528 ν 2 = 0.343896.
13 Under the negative status quo rule, the optimal cutoffs are γ * 1 = 0.778 and γ * 2 = 0.851. The social loss is 0.550.
14 The fact that we are violating the differentiability of the perturbed p.d.f. is not crucial -here it does no harm and we do it for simplicity, but in the proof of Theorem 1 it is shown how to avoid it.
The following table summarizes how the posterior odds ratios on the event E given unanimous recommendations (see (1)) change as θ is moved from θ = 0 to θ = 0.0003. R(1, 1; θ) R(0, 0; θ) θ = 0 2.76479 0.0299072 θ = 0.003 2.76083 0.0299363 This implies the following approximation for the derivatives in the shift parameter: ∂ θ R(1, 1; 0) ≈ −13.2 and ∂ θ R(0, 0; 0) ≈ −.0971. This is the change in the quality of the experts' predictions under the optimal rule.
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Thus, when θ is increased, improving the quality of information, the quality of both unanimous predictions goes down. The event is less likely to happen when both experts say that is going to happen, and more likely to happen when both experts say it is not going to happen.
Of course, since the outcome is optimal, the overall social loss of errors goes down after the information improvement. The important point is that the benefit of the better information comes in the discordant predictions of the experts, not their unanimous ones. In the case of a positive status quo rule, the consequence of a discordant prediction is that it prevents society from taking the preemptive action, which is good if the event is not happening. Indeed, because there are fewer of these errors by a sufficient margin, society actually does better, despite information being perverse. Thus, though altruistic expert interests do not get rid of perversity, they do get rid of the problem identified in the previous section (where experts had non-altruistic incentives): that information improvements can leave society strictly worse off.
No Perversity with One Agent
Theorem 1 shows that unless the information elasticities at the equilibrium satisfy a knifeedge condition, a perverse information improvement is possible. The next result states that this is essentially a two-agent phenomenon. Proposition 1. Fix payoffs of the game. Consider a signal structure (G 1 , G 2 ) and assume agent 2 has only one action available (so that there is only one strategic agent, namely agent 1). Then, given any stable equilibrium (γ * 1 , γ * 2 ) of the game, there is no variable signal structure ( G 1 , G 2 ) that (i) extends (G 1 , G 2 ) and (ii) is perverse at (γ * 1 , γ * 2 ).
When Cautious Agents Are Immune to Perversity
To better understand the strategic interactions it will be helpful to classify experts by how their payoffs depend on the other expert's actions when the rare event occurs. We say an expert i is cautious when his payoff is more sensitive to keeping up with the other expert than outperforming them: K i > O i . Conversely an agent is bold when his payoff is (weakly) more sensitive to outperforming the other expert than keeping up with them:
Perversity is impossible if both agents are cautious and the information improvements they receive are similar in that the density of their signal structure is perturbed in the same direction at the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Fix payoffs of the game such that both experts are cautious. Consider a signal structure (G 1 , G 2 ). Then, given any stable equilibrium (γ * 1 , γ * 2 ) of the game, there is no variable signal structure (
Reinforcing and Offsetting Strategic Interactions
We define strategic interactions as either re-enforcing or offsetting using best response "dynamics." Strategic interactions are reinforcing when, a change in cutoff strategy by one expert induces a change in cutoff strategy by the second expert, which in turn induces a further change in cutoff strategy by the first expert, and this change is in the same direction as the first expert's original change. Strategic interactions are offsetting when, a change in cutoff strategy by one expert induces a change in cutoff strategy by the second expert, which in turn induces a further change in cutoff strategy by the first expert, and this change is in the opposite direction as the first expert's original change. Given these definitions, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose one expert's information changes. Experts' strategic interactions are reinforcing, and their cutoffs change in the same direction, if and only if they are both cautious. Experts' strategic interactions are re-enforcing, and their cutoffs change in different directions, if and only if they are both bold.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 comes from whether experts' best responses are strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
16 A bold expert's cutoff strategy is a strategic substitute to the other expert's cutoff strategy (bold experts like to stand out), whereas a cautious expert's cutoff strategy is a strategic complement to the other expert's cutoff strategy (cautious experts like to herd). Two cautious experts' best response dynamics then reenforce each other strategic adjustments in the same direction, whilst two bold experts' best response dynamics reenforce each other's strategic adjustments in opposite directions. Corollary 1 demonstrates that to correctly interpret experts' predictions it is important to know which type each expert is. The strategic effects differ in both magnitude and direction depending on the experts' types.
Contracting Experts
We now embed the above problem into a contracting setting by considering a principal who values the information held by the experts for making a decision. The available experts may trade off different types of errors in different ways-from each other and from the principal.
We first consider efficient contracts. Standard results imply that the Vickrey-ClarkeGroves mechanism is the only efficient way to make use of the experts' information. This requires awarding pivotal experts the entire social surplus of making the correct decision. While this will usually be impractical, even in this efficient mechanism, perversity is still possible: improvements in information can make the experts' unanimous recommendations less reliable.
A natural alternative idea is to extract information about the experts' biases and to use this in interpreting their advice. We show that, when agents have (possibly very weak) heterogeneous preferences about their advice being followed, and the principal has some constraint on the size of the payments, such a plan requires the principal making decisions that she considers suboptimal given the experts' reports.
We interpret these results to mean that there are severe limits to a principal's ability to employ contracts to make good use of experts' information. This amplifies the difficulties created by coarse recommendations.
The Setting
The Principal's Interests
Formally, we consider a principal who seeks information from two experts about the probability that event E will occur. Having received predictions from the experts the principal must choose whether or not to take an action. The principal's payoffs are given by the following matrix:
As an example, suppose that the event is a bad event (such as a financial crisis) and that the action available to the principal is a costly preemptive move. The principal wants to make the preemptive move if the crisis is about to occur, but does not want to waste resources otherwise. We will usually think of the principal's payoffs as large relative to those of the experts. This is intended to reflect the fact that the principal's payoff from making a "correct" decision (taking preemptive action if the event occurs and not taking preemptive action if it does not) may represent those of a large population of agents who value correct decisions.
Expert Preferences
Consider an expert who has the following preferences, which depend on a privately known type θ ∈ Θ: E y = 1 y = 0
The numbers in the matrices are are any real numbers. This allows an expert to have preferences over various types of errors (Type I versus Type II) and allows him also to have preferences over his advice being followed. For the moment we are considering a principalagent setting in which there is no other expert
17 . An expert's payoff type consists of the numbers in the above matrices.
Contracts
We allow the principal to offer the expert an arbitrary contract, subject only to the constraint that the expert can only make a coarse (up or down) recommendation. We focus on mechanisms where agents reveal their payoff types, with the standard revelation-principle justification. This contract specifies two things. First, it specifies a function q so that q(x; θ) is the probability with which the action y = 1 is taken conditional on the reported type θ and the recommendation x. Second, the contract posits a transfer function t specifying transfers t(x, y, X; θ) that depend on the expert's recommendation, the action taken, whether the event happens (recall that X is the indicator variable of the event E), and the reported type.
The principal is not required to balance the budget and we assume she can commit to make any finite payment to the expert. (Later we will put constraints on the payments.) The principal can also commit to randomizing over the decision depending on the recommendation in an arbitrary way, even if this is not optimal given her beliefs after receiving the recommendation.
Timing
The timing of the interaction considered is as follows:
1. The principal announces the contract.
2. The agent privately learns his payoff type (drawn from some distribution) and his signal. Nature draws the private signal S ∈ [0, 1] whose cumulative distribution function is: G if E occurs and the uniform distribution otherwise.
3. The agent makes reports reportsθ andx to the principal.
4. The principal takes the action with probability q(x;θ).
5. The realization of the event is made public and the expert receives transfers t(x, y, X;θ).
As before, we will assume that G has a density g, which is increasing. We will also assume unbounded information: that g is unbounded. This ensures that an expert with a signal S = 1 is sure that the event is going to happen.
We assume G is the same across all payoff types.
The VCG Approach
To map our problem into a classic contracting setting, we fix a decision rule for the principal and model the social choice problem as one of selecting the sets Γ i so that agent i makes recommendation x i = 1 when his signal S i is in Γ i . This incorporates the constraint of coarse communication into the technology and allows us to use all the standard results of contract theory. In particular, we have the Green-Laffont result (generalized by Williams (1999) ) that any efficient mechanism is payoff-equivalent to a Vickerey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in which the expert receives the (positive or negative) social surplus when he is marginal to a decision. Efficient decisions are then taken and the principal does not need to know the expert's type. In effect, the decision of whether to take preemptive action or not is delegated to the experts. In the VCG mechanism, an expert's interests become aligned with those of society. As we showed in Section 3.4.3, perversity can still occur in this case: improvements in information can hurt the quality of unanimous advice.
While this is a useful benchmark, we do not view it as a particularly practical solution in the case of extracting expert guidance. The full surplus generated by good advice on, say, the right economic policy is so vast that it could never be collected and transferred. Even if large transfers could be made to approximate efficiency, they would create incentives for false experts to pretend to be knowledgeable in order to appropriate the rents. Aside from that, with such strong incentives, the experts' risk aversion may become a first-order consideration and their incentives to collude would likely become stronger.
Interpreting Advice
Given the demanding requirements of the VCG approach of transferring the residual surplus, another natural idea is to learn something about the preferences of an expert (in particular, how he trades off Type I and Type II errors) and use that information to interpret his advice. A recommendation that the crisis is coming from an expert who is very reluctant to falsely sound the alarm may merit being followed, whereas the same recommendation coming from an alarmist may be safe to ignore. In this section we study this possibility and find that taking this approach requires the principal to make decisions that are suboptimal given her beliefs, as long as there is any finite bound on the transfers she may make.
By switching the meanings of x = 0 and x = 1 if necessary, we may convert any contract into one such that the agent weakly prefers to make the recommendation x = 1 when S = 1. From now on, we will assume contracts have this form.
We define a prediction contract as payoff-type sensitive when the probability q(1; θ) is not constant over θ: if it treats the predictions of different payoff types differently when they recommend taking the action.
The first result is that a payoff-type sensitive contract must award influence purely based on agents' desire to be listened to. We denote the payoffs of a type θ by placing a subscript θ on the variables in the payoff matrix.
Proposition 3. Assume g is unbounded. Suppose that there are two types θ and θ so that q(1; θ) > q(1; θ ) and that truthful revelation of payoff-type is incentive-compatible. Then
Example 2. To understand the import of this result, let us consider a particular specification of the payoff matrices: E y = 1
Here the experts' payoffs decompose into two terms: (i) a personal (e.g. reputational) cost of making an error; (ii) a value of one's advice being followed by the principal. The cost of a Type I error -falsely predicting the event -isk(θ) > 0. The cost of a Type II error -failing to predict the event when it is about to happen -is k(θ) > 0. The value of having one's advice followed is f (θ). In the example, the costs of error will be much larger than the values of being followed.
Consider two types, A and B, so that k(A)/k(A) is very low and k(B)/k(B) is very high. Expert A is very conservative. It costs him much more in reputational terms to predict the event when it is not going to happen than to fail to predict it when it is going to happen. In contrast, expert B has the opposite preferences. It costs him much more in reputational terms to fail to predict the event when it is going to happen than to predict it falsely when it is not going to happen.
Suppose also that f (B) > f (A) are values of being followed, which are arbitrarily small in absolute value but nonzero.
It would seem natural for the principal, given certain priors, to elicit the type and then to take the preemptive action only when the conservative expert A recommends it. However, since it is the case that a(B) − b(B) = f (B) > f (A) = a(A) − b(A), then this cannot be accomplished in any incentive compatible contract.
Indeed, in the setting of Example 2, we can show that if the principal has any upper bound on the transfers she can make, then she cannot extract and use truthful reports about type without committing to take actions that are suboptimal given her beliefs after she hears the advice.
Corollary 2. Suppose there is an upper bound T < ∞ on the transfers the principal can make. For any δ > 0, we can find types as described in Example 1 with |f (θ)| < δ for all θ ∈ Θ, such that: if a contract is incentive-compatible and type-sensitive, then the principal must commit to making suboptimal decisions given her beliefs about E induced by the expert's advice.
The problem the principal faces that is driving Corollary 2 is, intuitively, as follows. Suppose the expert could not commit to making the wrong decision given her beliefs, and assume truth-telling by the experts. In this setting, the principal would adjust how she interprets an expert's predictions depending on the expert's type. Experts then want to manipulate the interpretation of their predictions depending on how much they like being followed. This can give all the different possible types of experts incentives to hide their type, depending on the recommendation they want to make. In particular, it is important that the information problem is double-sided: type A might want to imitate type B under some circumstances, and under other circumstances the opposite might be true. This prevents the principal from using the standard techniques to get "high types" to reveal themselves.
Why might two types of experts want to mimic each other? Suppose that one expert is liberal, in the sense of Example 2, and the other is conservative. Intuitively, liberal experts tend to have lower cutoff values and are more likely to report that the bad event is coming-unless given large payments to change their preferences. Similarly, conservative experts typically have higher cutoff values and are more likely to report that the bad event is not coming. The principal is then less inclined to believe (and follow) a liberal expert than a conservative one following a report of x i = 1. A liberal expert who likes to be followed and wants to report x i = 1 will then want the principal to think that he is conservative. Similarly a liberal expert who dislikes being followed and wants to report x i = 0 will want the principal to think he is conservative.
For similar reasons, the principal is less inclined to believe (and follow) a conservative expert than a liberal one after a report of x i = 0. A conservative expert who likes to be followed and wants to report x i = 0 will want the principal to think he is liberal. Similarly, a conservative expert who dislikes being followed and want to report x i = 1 will want the principal to think he is liberal.
One might think this problem could be undone with payments in the experts' contracts conditional on whether they are followed or not. This turns out not to be the case. A candidate contract for inducing truthful revelation would compensation experts who like to be followed when they are not followed and compensate experts who dislike being followed when they are followed. However, such a contract will not work. For instance, liberal experts who like to be followed and want to report x i = 1 will want the principal to think that they are cautious and dislike being followed. They will then be more like to be followed and will also receive more compensation in expectation.
Concluding Remarks
Our analysis raises several issues for further study. First, while expert advice in any realistic setting is somewhat coarse, our simplifying assumption of a binary prediction is not always a good fit. We conjecture that in settings with a larger finite number of possible predictions, better information can still lead to a lower quality of unanimous predictions in equilibrium, and sometimes to society being worse off in equilibrium when it uses the advice to make decisions. A more intricate analysis seems needed to consider this issue, but we believe it is worth doing.
Second, while we have identified the existence of perverse information improvements starting from a wide range of parameter values, we have not systematically studied how "likely" perverse improvements are as a subset of all the possible improvements. There are substantial challenges to formalizing this question, but it, too, may present an interesting avenue for further analysis.
Nevertheless we believe the basic phenomena identified in the model have important substantive implications. Most importantly, understanding the impact of improvements in information quality requires not only an understanding of the information technology itself, but also of its effect on the optimizing behavior of the multiple experts who use it, whose incentives depend on each other's behavior. Because of this optimizing behavior, better econometric tools need not lead to better economic counsel; better diagnostic technology need not lead to better diagnoses; better spying need not imply better military decisions; and better analysis of financial markets need not lead to better trades by market makers. In each of these cases, we might end up in the situation identified in Section 3.4.2, where the optimal use of the experts' decisions gives society less value than society got before information improved. Even in the best case, where experts aim for the social optimum, their unanimous recommendations may decline in credibility.
As a final remark, we believe that these issues may be worth exploring empirically, especially in cases for which there is a great deal of data, such as financial markets and medical diagnoses.
Proof of Proposition 4
The strategy of each expert is a measurable function σ i : [0, 1] → [0, 1], with σ i (s) describing the probability with which i plays x i = 1 upon observing the signal S i = s. The space of these functions can be made into a convex, compact space in the usual way (by defining mixtures pointwise). The utility function of each players is an affine function of his own strategy, and so the standard existence theorem applies (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991 , Theorem 1.2).
Cutoff Strategies
Particularly natural strategies for the expert are cutoff strategies: they involve choosing A if and only if the signal S i is above some cutoff. Proposition 5 shows that under the two assumptions in Section that cutoff strategies are used in equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Under the assumptions in Section 2.4, there exist two numbers γ 1 and γ 2 such that, for any strategy of the other expert, each expert i has a unique best response of choosing A with probability 1 when S i > γ i and choosing N with probability 1 when S i < γ i .
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider, without loss of generality, expert 1, and fix any strategy σ 2 for expert 2. Given S 1 = s, expert 1 assesses some conditional probability r(s) of the event E, and also some probability q(s) that x 2 = A. That is,
We have expanded q(s) in terms of r(s) and the other player's strategy: the probability that x 2 = 1 conditional on E is 1 0 σ 2 (s 2 )g(s 2 ) ds 2 , by definition of σ 2 ; and conditional on E it is 1 0 σ 2 (s 2 ) ds 2 , since in this case S 2 is uniformly distributed. Define z 1 = 1 0 σ 2 (s 2 )g(s 2 ) ds 2 and z 2 = 1 0 σ 2 (s 2 ) ds 2 . The expected utility to expert 1 of playing 1 is
The expected utility of playing 0 is
By our monotone likelihood ratio assumption, r(s) is strictly increasing in s. Using (2),
Using the assumption of no strategic sensitivity under the null and the definitions of K i and O i , we can rewrite this as:
Viewing z 1 , z 2 , and r(s) as arbitrary numbers in [0, 1], we can use elementary calculus (maximizing and minimizing the right hand side over these variables) to see that this expression is always between 2K 1 − O 1 + K 1 and −K 1 + 2O 1 + K 1 . The assumption of limited strategic sensitivity guarantees that both numbers are positive. Thus,
everywhere. This implies that player 1 best responds with the cutoff strategy described in the statement of the proposition (possibly with γ 1 equal to 0 or 1). The argument for expert 2 is symmetric. An important implication of Proposition 5 for the subsequent analysis is that without loss of generality we can take the strategy space to be the set [0, 1], instead of the unwieldy space of functions σ i : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. The only ambiguity this reduction leaves is what happens in the event {S i = γ i }, but since this event is of measure 0 and thus never affects expected payoffs or best responses, we ignore the issue.
By setting (3) to zero and simplifying, we find that at an interior cutoff equilibrium, the first-order condition defining a best-response is
Here we have used that g i is continuous (because it is differentiable) so that this expression can be satisfied exactly. If there is no strategic interaction under the null, then O i = K i . Thus the above can be rewritten as
Existence and Uniqueness of Interior Equilibria
The previous results show that equilibrium exists and is in cutoff strategies. But for the purpose of doing comparative statics, interior and at least locally unique equilibria will be desirable. To ensure the existence of interior equilibria it will be necessary to make an one more assumption in addition to the ones in Section 2.4. This is limited sensitivity to nature:
. It ensures that the ratios of strategic sensitivities are bounded by the informativeness of signals, as measured by the values of the density g.
Proposition 6. Under the Assumptions in Section 2.4 and limited sensitivity to nature there exists an interior Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6 For concreteness, fix i = 1 and j = 2; of course, the argument is symmetric when they are reversed. Given that player 2 is using a threshold γ 2 , we can write the expected utility to player 1 of choosing threshold γ 1 as Differentiating in γ 1 we find:
Under the assumption of no strategic sensitivity under the null (K i = O i ), we can manipulate (5) to deduce that
has the same sign as
Since g 1 is increasing, the marginal utility of increasing γ 1 is strictly decreasing, which implies that if an interior solution to the first order condition exists, then it is a global maximum. The assumption of limited sensitivity to nature guarantees that z(0) < 0 and z(1) > 0, guaranteeing that an optimum must exist (by the intermediate value theorem) and be interior. To guarantee uniqueness the maintained assumption that there is limited strategic sensitivity can be strengthened. There is elasticity-bounded strategic sensitivity when
This condition requires that the sensitivity of each expert's payoff to the other expert's prediction is not too large, where what too large means is determined by the probabilistic fundamentals.
Proposition 7. Under the assumptions in Section 2.4, limited sensitivity to nature, and strongly limited strategic sensitivity there exists a unique interior Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7 Differentiating (4) implicitly in γ j under the assumption of no strategic sensitivity under the null we obtain ∂γ * i
In the second step we used the first-order condition. Now note that strongly limited strategic sensitivity implies that this number is always at most one. Since this applies to both best response curves, they can intersect at most once.
The proofs of the lemmas appear at the end of the proof of this theorem. In Lemma 3, y should be informally thought of as corresponding to . The exact way in which y and z are used will be clear in a moment.
Note that Lemma 3 along with Proposition 8 immediately implies that perversity cannot obtain if 1 2 = 1 2 . On the other hand, if 1 2 = 1 2 , then we can find y and z to make (7) and (8) true. By Lemma 2, we can choose the variable information structure to make ∂ θ g 1 (γ * 1 (0); 0) equal to a large multiple of y and ∂ θ g 2 (γ * 2 (0); 0) equal to a large multiple of z, with the ∂ θ G i (γ i ; 0) comparatively negligible. By making the multiples large enough, we can overwhelm the effect of the terms proportional to the ∂ θ G i (γ i ; 0), making the top left entry of ∂ θ L negative and the bottom right entry of it positive.
We finish by proving the key lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 2 The function is depicted in Figure 4 . We will define, for some parameters λ i > 0, µ i > 0, and ν i ∈ R, g i (s; θ) = g i (s) + θ · λ i h(µ i (s − ν i )) and then define G i as the corresponding c.d.f. Since h is differentiable, all differentiability and continuity assumptions we have made are preserved. Note that, as long as µ i (1 − ν i ) ≥ 1 then this is a well-defined density, as it integrates to 1 over [0, 1] . It is also clear that ( G 1 , G 2 ) extends (G 1 , G 2 ). Moreover, because of the sine curve shape of h, we have that γ i 0 λ i h(µ i (s − ν i ))ds is everywhere nonpositive and strictly negative for some values of γ i , so that G i (γ i ; θ) is weakly decreasing in θ, and strictly for some values of γ i . This satisfies (a) in the statement of the lemma.
Set λ i to be equal to the desired magnitude of the derivative ∂ θ g i (γ * i (0); 0). Fix µ i at some large number. If we want ∂ θ g i (γ * i (0); 0) to be positive, then choose ν i so that µ i (γ i −ν i ) = 1/2; if we want ∂ θ g i (γ * i (0); 0) to be negative, set µ i (γ i − ν i ) = −1/2; otherwise, set µ i (γ i − ν i ) = 0. Now, by making the initial choice of µ i large enough, we can make the integral of λh(µ i (s−ν i )) arbitrarily small, satisfying part (b) in the statement of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3 If the matrix
M =
1 + ρ 2 (v 1 ) 2 2 + ρ 1 (v 2 ) 1 1 + ρ 2 (v 1 ) 2 2 + ρ 1 (v 2 ) 1 is nonsingular, then such y and z can be found by solving
We claim that if M is singular, then such y and z cannot be found. The argument is as follows. It is only possible to satisfy (7) and (8) if the bottom row of M is a negative scalar multiple of the top. Using Lemma 1, which signs the epsilons, this is possible if and only if there is a positive k so that
and 2 + k 2 = −ρ 1 (v 2 )( 1 + k 1 ).
Multiplying (9) and (10) and cancelling the terms involving the elasticities (which are f (B) = δ/2. Since the contract is type-sensitive, the principal must not make the same decision following A and B playing x = 1. Then Proposition 3 requires that the principal take the pre-emptive action with higher probability following B playing x = 1, which cannot be optimal given her beliefs.
